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## Civil War and the (Almost) Forgotten Pact of Brundisium

Lange, Carsten Hjort

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**FRANCISCO PINA POLO (ed.)**

# **THE TRIUMVIRAL PERIOD**

**CIVIL WAR, POLITICAL CRISIS  
AND SOCIOECONOMIC  
TRANSFORMATIONS**

EDITORIAL UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA  
PRENSAS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA

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TRANSFORMATIONS

*Francisco Pina Polo (ed.)*

EDITORIAL UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA  
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*This book is dedicated to the memory of Fergus Millar*

# CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

<i>Francisco Pina Polo</i> .....	13
----------------------------------	----

### I.

#### CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TRIUMVIRAL AND REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS

The Triumvirate *Rei Publicae Constituendae*:

Political and Constitutional Aspects

<i>Frederik Juliaan Vervaeke</i> .....	23
--	----

The Functioning of the Republican Institutions under the Triumvirs

<i>Francisco Pina Polo</i> .....	49
----------------------------------	----

*Senatum ... incondita turba* (Suet. *Aug.* 35.1). Was the Senate Composed so  
as to Ensure its Compliance?

<i>Marie-Claire Ferrière</i> .....	71
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### II.

#### WAR AND PEACE

The Notion of *Bellum Civile* in the Last Century of the Republic

<i>Valentina Arena</i> .....	101
------------------------------	-----

Civil War and the (Almost) Forgotten Pact of Brundisium

<i>Carsten Hjort Lange</i> .....	127
----------------------------------	-----

A Framework of Negotiation and Reconciliation in the Triumviral period

<i>Hannah Cornwell</i> .....	149
------------------------------	-----

Children for the Family, Children for the State: Attitudes towards and the Handling of Offspring during the Triumvirate <i>Francesca Rohr Vio</i> .....	171
--	-----

### III. STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The Intersection of Oratory and Institutional Change <i>Catherine Steel</i> .....	195
Invectivity in the City of Rome in the Caesarian and Triumviral periods <i>Martin Jehne</i> .....	209
Fear in the City during the Triumviral Period: The Expression and Exploitation of a Politic Emotion <i>Frédéric Hurlet</i> .....	229
The Reception of Octavian's Oratory and Public Communication in the Imperial Period <i>Henriette van der Blom</i> .....	249
Information Exchange and Political Communication in the Triumviral Period: Some Remarks on Means and Methods <i>Enrique García Riaza</i> .....	281
Marcus Antonius: Words and Images <i>Kathryn Welch</i> .....	301

### IV. CRISIS AND RESTORATION AT ROME AND IN ITALY

Consumption, Construction, and Conflagration: The Archaeology of Socio-political Change in the Triumviral Period <i>Dominik Maschek</i> .....	327
The Socio-political Experience of the Italians during the Triumviral Period <i>Cristina Rosillo-López</i> .....	353
<i>Hasta infinita?</i> Financial Strategies in the Triumviral Period <i>Marta García Morcillo</i> .....	379

### V. THE TRIUMVIRS AND THE PROVINCES

Provinces and Provincial Command during the Triumvirate: Hispania as a Study Case <i>Alejandro Díaz Fernández</i> .....	401
--	-----

Triumviral Documents from the Greek East	
<i>Andrea Raggi</i> .....	431
Antonius and Athens	
<i>W. Jeffrey Tatum</i> .....	451

VI.  
CONCLUSION

Law, Violence and Trauma in the Triumviral Period	
<i>Clifford Ando</i> .....	477
INDEX OF ANCIENT NAMES .....	495
INDEX OF SUBJECTS .....	503



# CIVIL WAR AND THE (ALMOST) FORGOTTEN PACT OF BRUNDISIUM

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This is an article about civil war; or, more precisely, an article on the impact of civil war on Roman society and Roman culture in general during the Late Republic, especially during the early days of the Triumvirate. It is also an article about those evolutions in political discourse which related to civil war, its justification and its ideology, during the period. Ancient civil war remains an insufficiently understood phenomenon. Only in recent years have scholars begun to fathom what civil war can tell us about the internal cohesion of ancient societies, about processes of identity formation, social conflict, disintegration and reintegration and so forth: in other words, its profound impact.<sup>1</sup>

In a recent study Scheidel asks the fascinating question of how civil war affects inequality.<sup>2</sup> Even though his question is of great interest, we should

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1 On impact: Osgood 2006; 2014; Breed – Damon – Rossi 2010; Welch 2012; Wienand 2012; Börm 2013; Börm – Mattheis – Wienand 2016; Eckert 2016; Havener 2016; Lange 2016; Armitage 2017a; Ginsberg 2017; Ginsberg – Krasne 2018; Maschek 2018; Omissi 2018; Rosenblitt 2019; Lange – Vervaeke 2019b. Some recent studies focus specifically on trauma, a psychological term: see Eckert 2016; Rosenblitt 2019. Rosenblitt 2019: 4: “Roman society never came to grips with the political and cultural trauma of the civil wars”. Undoubtedly the fear of civil war gripped Roman society, even during periods without civil war. The concept of “impact” adopted in this article is broader than that of “trauma” and includes not only the political machinations, but their broader packaging: language, ideologies, conceptual discourses, and so forth. It may perhaps more than anything help us realise that even if civil war is and was a terrible thing, it still needed to be talked about and justified. No wonder the civil war dynasts mostly focused on the positive outcome: the ending of civil war.

2 Scheidel 2017: 202.

have serious concerns with his overall approach to civil war. According to Scheidel the American Civil War displayed many of the characteristics of large-scale interstate war, including massive mobilisation on both sides.<sup>3</sup> He concludes that it is best seen as a hybrid.<sup>4</sup> This rather bold conclusion leads him to identify the same hybridity in the Late Republican civil war(s). Notwithstanding their internal dimensions—a conflict among the aristocracy, triggered by competition—he identifies also key features of interstate war, such as a mass mobilisation and high participation rates.<sup>5</sup> But this definition wrongly puts the cart before the horse. Why would we define the conflict that brought about the very concept of civil war, as well as many of its related conceptual discussions, as a hybrid, as the odd one out? If we look at the concept itself, surely the two civil wars – the Late Republican and the American – are two of only a handful examples of proper civil wars: they are wars (*bella*) fought between citizens (*cives*). This may after all be too extreme an approach; and too exclusive a definition denies many conflicts the name of civil war. We should furthermore remember that *bellum* does not necessarily mean conventional warfare between two large opposing armies, neither in an ancient nor in a modern context.<sup>6</sup> Even so, to present the two examples as hybrids seems to me to misunderstand the concept and its historical context. What would we gain? It is of capital importance that all modern debates about civil war should rightfully take the Late Republic as their conceptual point of departure. Furthermore, as ancient historians we should not be over-influenced by modern definitions and approaches if these obscure the historical context of civil war.

## 1. Victory in Civil War

To turn to the first of the key developments in the language and ideology of civil war in our period, one of the most pressing questions is the actual commemoration and celebration of victory over *cives*. The traditional Roman way of celebrating a military victory was the ritual of triumph, with a natural focus on victory itself. We may remember Polybius' assessment of Roman

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3 Scheidel 2017: 174–175.

4 Scheidel 2017: 179, cf. 204: the American Civil War is treated as the equivalent to an interstate war.

5 Scheidel 2017: 206.

6 Lange 2017, also emphasising the connection between *stasis* and *bellum civile*.

warfare at 1.37.7, where he writes that the Romans use violent force for all purposes. Warfare was a force for something good. But in a civil war context such celebrations became much more complex: internal war was never meant to happen in the first place. Having said that, none of the main protagonists of the civil wars of the Late Republic necessarily *concealed* their role in civil war—how would such a slight of hand have been possible? They instead changed their language and their justifications over time, and these changes are clearly visible in our evidence.

Sulla, for example, celebrated his civil war victory as part of his triumph against Mithridates. The latter seems a conventional celebration of a clearly foreign war; but importantly, Pliny records that the second day of the triumph vaunted the gold and silver Marius the Younger had taken from Rome to Praeneste.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Plutarch tells us that Sulla's triumphal celebration also included a number of former exiles.<sup>8</sup> These facts complicate matters. The celebrations almost redefined the foreign war as a mixed conflict that also necessitated the destruction of internal Roman enemies. The triumph in this case symbolised the end of foreign war, but also indirectly the end of civil war.<sup>9</sup> According to Sallust, (the appearance of) *concordia* and *pax* was part of the ideology of the Sullan regime, both obviously connected to reconciliation after civil war.<sup>10</sup> *Concordia* was of course already well-established in this game of civil war justification with Lucius Opimius in 121 BCE. The Temple of Concord celebrated his victory over the Gracchi—fellow Romans, but also seditious and potential tyrants.<sup>11</sup> Appian nicely sums up the situation:<sup>12</sup>

καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς φόνοις ἐκάθαιρεν. ἡ δὲ βουλὴ καὶ νεῶν Ὀμονοίας αὐτὸν ἐν ἀγορᾷ προσέταξεν ἐγείραι.

A lustration of the city was performed for the bloodshed, and the Senate ordered the building of a temple to Concord in the forum.

7 Plin. *HN* 33.16

8 Plut. *Sull.* 34.1.

9 Lange – Vervaeke 2019a; Havener 2014: 167-169; Rosenblitt 2019: 13 is right to emphasise that “Sulla's regime and its legacy were at the heart of the late republican collapse.”

10 Sall. *Hist.* frg. 49, Lepidus 24.

11 Plut. *C. Gracch.* 17 for the famous *dictum* of discord building a temple to concord; Cic. *Sest.* 140; August. *De civ. D.* 3.25; Pina Polo 2017: 13-14 and 19 on this as a monument to the tyrannicide.

12 App. *B Civ.* 1.26.

A monument to civil war and *stasis*, no less! Thucydides talks of the change and degeneration of language during civil war.<sup>13</sup> This is also the case at Rome. *Seditio* means revolt and rebellion, but also *stasis*.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, *hostis* can signify anything from a foreign to an internal enemy, but at the same time an enemy that in principle no longer should be considered a citizen.<sup>15</sup> The Romans begin to use the language of foreign war when describing and justifying their internal wars and civil wars (as with the triumph). The changing language of civil war evinces, therefore, a changing perception of the new normality.

Later, Caesar partly ‘externalised’ his civil war with Pompeius. We might argue (with Rosenblitt) that “the foreignization of civil wars played out in multiple ways in Rome after the Sullan traumas”;<sup>16</sup> but there were usually multiple narratives, as this article hopes to show by focusing on one of the few exceptions. Caesar’s self-justification portrayed him forced into civil war by Romans behaving like barbarians—but he never claimed that it was not a civil war.<sup>17</sup> An even more profound change happened in 44 BCE: a statue with a civic

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13 Thuc. 3.82.4 (with Spielberg 2017): καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργον· τὸ δ’ ἐμπλήκτως ὁξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοῖρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλευσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος (“Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal supporter; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question incapacity to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribution of manliness; cautious plotting a justifiable means of self-defence”).

14 Lavan 2017: 21; Cic. *Rep.* 6.1.

15 From 88 BCE: Cic. *Brut.* 168; Liv. *Per.* 77; Vell. Pat. 2.19.1; Val. Max. 1.5.5; App. *B Civ.* 1.60 etc.; Rosenblitt 2019: 115 suggests that the term *hostis* refers to an external foe, but seems to underestimate the change in language; cf. 123: this goes back to 88 BCE; so already Lange 2016: esp. 103–105. Rosenblitt 2019: 59: “*Tumultus* points to a military crisis in the vicinity of Rome. ‘*Tumultus Lepidi*’ thus emphasizes the military danger and the Etrurian dimension to the crisis”. Be that as it may, the mere mention of the name of the enemy – Lepidus – naturally points towards an internal crisis. We should of course also remember the great flexibility of such concepts. When Cicero was trying hard to get the proconsul M. Antonius (*cos.* 44) declared a *hostis publicus*, he was strenuously opposed in this endeavour by L. Iulius Caesar (*cos.* 64), who insisted that the term *bellum* be replaced with *tumultus* (*Phil.* 12.17): “I consistently called Antonius a public enemy (*hostis*), while others [L. Iulius Caesar] called him an adversary (*adversarius*); I consistently called this a war (*bellum*), while others called it a public emergency (*tumultus*).”

16 Rosenblitt 2019: 88.

17 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.29.3 is the first mention of *bellum civile*; cf. 3.1.3; 1.67.3; 3.1.4; *contra* Grillo 2012: esp. 106–117.

crown was set up on the Rostra to honour Caesar for ending the civil war.<sup>18</sup> In a much more malicious manner, Caesar's African triumph included depictions of the deaths of Scipio, Petreius, and Cato—even if no names were mentioned.<sup>19</sup> The balance between vengeance and spite vs. *clementia* and the end of civil war was always part of the reckoning. In this case Caesar's actions resembled Sulla's letter to the Senate in 85 BCE, announcing his imminent return and his intention to take vengeance on all those guilty on behalf of all those wronged and Rome itself.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, we may recount the proscriptions and the severed (Roman) heads displayed on the Rostra.<sup>21</sup> This extreme and conspicuous display of the punishment of (former) Romans was of course later reused by the Triumvirs.

Having been victorious at Actium and Alexandria, Augustus famously claims in the *Res Gestae* that he had stopped this madness—that is, ended civil war: *in consulatu sexto et septimo, postqua[m b]el[la ciuil]ia exstinxeram*.<sup>22</sup> His triumph over Antonius at Actium was the quintessential example of the blurring of foreign and civil war, but far subtler than Sulla's. One example will suffice. After Actium, the slogan *pax parva terra marique* is also used on the Victory Monument at Actium/Nicopolis, emphasising that peace had been secured on land and sea. Deliberately, no enemy is mentioned, which in turn does point to a civil war.<sup>23</sup> At the same time the monument was also part of the new policy of *pax*:<sup>24</sup> peace after civil war.

Whatever we make of this, all three dynasts have one thing in common: they fought what they themselves considered necessary civil wars, adding claims to a defensive and consequently a just position. Naturally these were civil wars 'started by others'! Rome did not hide its empire nor its victories, not even its civil war victories. Sulla most likely even invented the concept of *bellum civile*. The fragments of his memoirs, cited in Plutarch's *Moralia*, display a great historical example of vanity: Sulla portrayed the civil war as his greatest victory, a great war for a great general.<sup>25</sup> Plutarch in the *Moralia* describes Sulla's war as

18 App. *B Civ.* 2.106; Dio Cass. 44.4.5.

19 App. *B Civ.* 2.101; Lange 2016: esp. 107-111.

20 App. *B Civ.* 1.77.

21 Lange 2020b.

22 *RGDA* 34.1.

23 Lange 2016: esp. chapter 6 for a more developed argument.

24 Cornwell 2017.

25 Plut. *Mor.* 786D-E = *FRHist.* II.22 [F26]: ὁ δὲ Σύλλας, ὅτε τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων τὴν Ἰταλίαν καθήρας προσέμιξε τῇ Ῥώμῃ πρῶτον, οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ κατέδαρθεν, ὑπὸ γήθους καὶ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ὥσπερ πνεύματος ἀναφερόμενος τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ γέγραφεν

an ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος, giving his Greek equivalent for the Latin *bellum civile*.<sup>26</sup> By joining the dots between the case of Sulla and that of Augustus we can see how the language and ideology of civil war developed during the Late Republic. But what role did the Triumvirate play in this development?

Having established the above framework, encompassing victory in civil war and its termination, the remainder of this article will place the Pact of Brundisium, including the subsequent joint ovation of Young Caesar and Antonius, within that framework. There are numerous ways of approaching the combatants during the civil war period in the aftermath of the death of Caesar, one being that of dynasts or factional leaders. The concept of “dynasts” seems in many ways a good approach, as it is central to the description of the period by our main sources. In Book 52 Cassius Dio famously emphasizes that in 29 BCE the Romans reverted to monarchical government: “Such were the achievements of the Romans and such their suffering under the kingship (*basileia*), under the Republic (*demokratia*), and under the dominion of a few (*dynasteiai*), during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years”.<sup>27</sup> 56.37.1-7 includes a “list” of dynasts.<sup>28</sup> The basic units of understanding are individual dynasts, fighting for supremacy with their networks of support; this points towards a balance of power game between the leading dynasts. Of course we cannot eliminate ideology from the Roman civil wars entirely. We should not, however, forget the multiple descriptions of human nature in civil war in the ancient evidence, including the role of un-ideological or extra-ideological motivations for individuals joining a particular side.<sup>29</sup>

## 2. The Triumvirate

If we accept the concentration of the ancient evidence upon individuals, the Triumvirate becomes in essence the joining of factional leaders, or dynasts or stasiarchs. An alliance of dynasts *tout court*. Seneca nicely adds to this basic

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ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν (“as he entered Rome for the first time after cleansing Italy of its civil wars, Sulla did not sleep at all that night, borne up in his spirit by great joy and gladness, as by a wind”; he has written this about himself in his memoirs”)

26 See Lange – Vervaeke 2019a for a more developed argument.

27 Dio Cass. 52.1.1.

28 Cf. App. *B Civ.* 2.17, 19; see Lange 2019a; 2020a.

29 See for example Dio Cass. 37.55.2-3; 45.8.3-4; Christia 2012: 3: individuals and warring groups naturally aimed to emerge on the winning side.

approach to the politics of the Late Republic: *quid defcimus? et res publica suos triumviros habet* (“Why do we lose heart? The republic too has its triumvirs [Brutus, Cassius and perhaps even Sextus Pompeius, although he changed sides at Misenum].”).<sup>30</sup> It is fair to say that the different sides behaved in a similar fashion. The Triumvirate was an extraordinary command, which included some specific tasks.<sup>31</sup> Appian writes:<sup>32</sup>

καινήν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἐς διόρθωσιν τῶν ἐμφυλίων νομοθετηθῆναι Λεπίδῳ τε καὶ Ἀντωνίῳ καὶ Καίσαρι, ἦν ἐπὶ πενταετὲς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν, ἴσον ισχύουσιν ὑπάτοις·

that a new magistracy for setting straight the civil dissensions [= civil wars] should be created by law, which Lepidus, Antonius, and Caesar should hold for five years with consular power [trans. Welch 2019].

This quotation requires some explanation. Polybius 1.65.1-2 uses the concept of *emphylios polemos* to describe what was technically an “internal war” between Rome and the Falisci in 241 BCE. Appian however normally prefers ἐμφύλια to ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος.<sup>33</sup> Appian thus unmistakably connects violence and *stasis* to *polemos* under the heading ἐμφύλιος.<sup>34</sup> He shows that both are part of the same development—the essence of which is different degrees of violence—and thus that civil war is an integral part of the *Emphyilia*. Following this logic, Appian may even have the civil wars begin in 133 BCE with the murder of Tiberius Gracchus.<sup>35</sup> At the same time he marks the beginning of a new phase at 88 BCE.<sup>36</sup> This turning point—including the sack of Rome—opens up the final phase in *stasis* at Rome. From that point the stasiarchs fought one another with great armies in the fashion of war (πολέμου νόμῳ), and with the fatherland as their prize. This point is reiterated later:<sup>37</sup> the battle between Marius and Sulla at Rome in 88 BCE was the first fought in the city not ὑπὸ εἰκόνι στάσεως (“in the guise of *stasis*”), but “unambiguously with bugle and standard, in the fashion of war” (ἀπροφασίστως ὑπὸ σάλπιγγι καὶ σημείοις, πολέμου νόμῳ). Cassius Dio’s interpretation is similar:<sup>38</sup> initially civil strife was

30 Sen. *Suas.* 6.11.

31 Vervaeke 2014: 239-252; see Lange 2009: chapter 1 on its assignment.

32 App. *B Civ.* 4.2.6; for the language of *stasis* in Appian, see now Welch 2019

33 But see for example *B Civ.* 1.40; 2.103; 4.33; 5.28.

34 Cf. Lange 2017; Straumann 2017: 142-145; Welch 2019; *contra* Armitage 2017a: 35-58.

35 App. *B Civ.* 1.2.

36 App. *B Civ.* 1.55.

37 App. *B Civ.* 1.58.

38 Dio Cass. 52.16.2.

confined to political quarrels within the city, but later spread like a contagion into legions, then battlefields (“at first it was only at home and within our walls that we broke up into factions and quarrelled, but afterwards we even carried this plague out into the legions” (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἴκοι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους κατὰ συστάσεις ἐστασιάσαμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο προηγόμεν)). The scale of fighting—albeit often blurred<sup>39</sup>—still emphasises that violence, civil strife and civil war are part of the same phenomenon. In Appian that is called “civil war”, or ἐμφύλια (see also below).

To return to the Triumvirate we have already mentioned the proscriptions, a Sullan measure.<sup>40</sup> These were followed by the civil war against the murderers of Caesar: ἔν ἐστι λοιπὸν ἔτι ἔργον, στρατεῦειν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέραν θαλάσσης αὐτόχειρας Γαῖου (“one task still remains, and that is to march against Caesar’s assassins beyond the sea”).<sup>41</sup> It clearly comes across that the main assignment of the Triumvirate was to end the civil war(s) and consequently solidify the state: hence the title (*tresviri rei publicae constituendae*). This becomes even more evident—as the discussion below hopes to show—when reflecting on the Pact of Brundisium and its aftermath.

### 3. Brundisium and Aftermath

After Philippi, many may have believed that the assignment of the Triumvirs was at an end. Yet it is at this point that Antonius “received” the (new) task of pacifying the East, while it fell to the lot of Young Caesar to neutralise Sextus Pompeius should he make a hostile move and to settle the veterans of the Triumvirs in Italy.<sup>42</sup> These tasks were later restated in the Pact of Brundisium. Appian refers to the task of eliminating Sextus: “Young Caesar was to make war against Pompeius unless they should come to some arrangement, and Antonius was to make war against the Parthians to avenge their treachery toward Crassus” (πολεμεῖν δὲ Πομπηίῳ μὲν Καίσαρα, εἰ μὴ τι συμβαίνοι, Παρθυαίοις δὲ Ἀντώνιον, ἀμυνόμενον τῆς ἐς Κράσσον παρασπονδήσεως).<sup>43</sup>

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39 Lange 2017.

40 App. *B Civ.* 4.8-11 on the edict.

41 App. *B Civ.* 4.9.

42 Dio Cass. 48.2.2 [Sextus]; Dio Cass. 48.3.3-6 emphasises the panic in Italy caused by land distributions after Philippi; Suet. *Aug.* 13.3 [veterans].

43 App. *B Civ.* 5.65.



The relationships between the Triumvirs had declined after Philippi. Even though Lucius Antonius survived the civil war-episode at Perugia, this will hardly have done much good for the relationship of the Triumvirs. In any case, Lucius Antonius had apparently been criticising the Triumvirs—especially Young Caesar as his opposite number—for not laying down their powers after the completion of their assignments.<sup>44</sup> Following on from that, Young Caesar took over Gaul when Antonius' man, the governor Calenus, died.<sup>45</sup> This clearly suggests that the Triumvirs behaved like individual dynasts, maximising their own potential.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, it is fair to say that Young Caesar was not in control of affairs in Italy.<sup>47</sup>

To bring Sextus Pompeius more fully into focus: Appian suggests that the Triumvirs disagreed on what to do against him.<sup>48</sup> Appian also suggests an early deal between Antonius and Sextus Pompeius.<sup>49</sup> We may accept Appian's narrative, but the shift in balance of power was brief indeed. Soon afterward it changed again, as Antonius decided to continue his arrangements with Young Caesar. Perhaps Antonius was using Sextus Pompeius in his own struggle. Cassius Dio sums it up as follows:<sup>50</sup>

διὰ τε οὖν ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς φεύγοντας αὐτὸν ὑποδέχεσθαι τὴν τε τοῦ Ἀντωνίου φιλίαν πράττειν καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας πολλὰ πορθεῖν, καταλλαγῆναί οἱ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐπεθύμησε· διαμαρτῶν δὲ τούτου ἐκεῖνῳ μὲν Μάρκον Οὐψάνιον Ἀγρίππαν πολεμῆσαι ἐκέλευσεν.

For these reasons, and because Sextus was harbouring the exiles, cultivating the friendship of Antonius, and plundering a great portion of Italy, Caesar desired to become reconciled with him; but when he failed of that, he ordered Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa to wage war against him.

Even if Dio refers to a potential deal between Antonius and Sextus, as also mentioned by Appian, both statements point towards a balance of power

44 I.e. Philippi and defeating Caesar's murderers: see App. *B Civ.* 5.19-20, 30, 39. For the context and war at Perugia, which takes up much of Appian's book 5, see 5.14-49.

45 App. *B Civ.* 5.51; cf. 61; Dio Cass. 48.20.3-4.

46 See Christia 2012.

47 This may be a reason why we should believe the story of the Perugia killings, as an example of indiscriminate violence, possibly resulting from the lack of control Young Caesar had at this time in Italy; Lange 2020a.

48 App. *B Civ.* 5.61-62; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 13.3; Lange 2009: esp. 26-33.

49 App. *B Civ.* 5.54; in general see Welch 2012; 2019.

50 Dio Cass. 48.20.1.

game between the leading dynasts.<sup>51</sup> This was indeed a tangled web. Under these extreme circumstances Antonius, logically, was ready to make a deal with Sextus *should it be necessary*.<sup>52</sup>

To bring other actors into focus, there is no denying that after the Perusine war Antonius arrived at Brundisium in 40 BCE to a Rome on the brink of another civil war, this time between the two Triumvirs. In the end their soldiers refused to fight.<sup>53</sup> The ensuing settlement of Brundisium extended the Triumvirs' assignment: the new task given to Young Caesar, as I mentioned earlier, was to deal with Sextus and thus to conclude the civil war.<sup>54</sup>

More than anything the Brundisium Treaty seems to suggest that Antonius had accepted Sextus Pompeius as a problem and had decided that the alliance with Young Caesar was more important and (or) logical, even if he still wanted to include Sextus in a deal.<sup>55</sup> Cassius Dio writes in Book 48 that "they accordingly divided the empire anew in this way and undertook in common the war against Sextus, although Antonius through messengers had taken oaths by which he had bound himself to Sextus against Caesar" (τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν οὕτως αὐτοῖς διεδάσαντο, τὸν δὲ δὴ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Σέξτον ἐκοινώσαντο, καίτοι τοῦ Ἀντωνίου ὄρκους πρὸς αὐτὸν δι' ἀγγέλων ἐπὶ τῷ Καίσαρι πεποιημένου).<sup>56</sup> This is again a description of the dealings of dynasts—and about the balance of power. At 48.30.4, Dio again mentions an agreement between Sextus and Antonius to make war on Young Caesar; but then realizing that this would never happen, Sextus once again raided Italy. Antonius was however right to include Sextus: the famine at Rome and the continued raids simply necessitated a deal. This was an unacceptable situation and in the end the Triumvirs were forced to cut a deal with him.<sup>57</sup> There can be no doubt that in 39 BCE, Sextus Pompeius was more than ready to do so: Welch is right to suggest that compromise was a necessity in the stasiotic politics of this period.<sup>58</sup> The Misenum Treaty was cynical insofar as it was a necessary deal for all parties.<sup>59</sup>

51 Dio Cass. 48.29.1.

52 Cf. Osgood 2006: 187.

53 App. *B Civ.* 5.64.

54 App. *B Civ.* 5.65; Dio Cass. 48.28.4; Lange 2009: esp. 29-33.

55 App. *B Civ.* 5.65.

56 Dio Cass. 48.29.1.

57 Dio Cass. 48.31.4.

58 Welch 2012: 53.

59 *Contra* Welch 2012: 238.

There was an amnesty after the murder of Caesar and again at the Treaty of Misenum for those who had opposed the Triumvirs and Young Caesar.<sup>60</sup>

The Brundisium incident was typical inasmuch as the dealings of the dynasts with each other are concerned, but atypical inasmuch as the Triumvirs were fighting it out amongst themselves. The question remains of what actually happened. Welch suggests that Antonius made a deal with Sextus Pompeius and consequently there was open conflict with Young Caesar.<sup>61</sup> This needs however to be incorporated into the narrative of the soldiers refusing to fight as well as the assignment of the Triumvirate. Either the Triumvirs tried to sell the idea that there was no civil war; or, alternatively, there never actually was, meaning that the fighting was not deemed to be quite a *bellum*. Whatever the case, looking at the list of civil wars as presented by Suetonius, Brundisium seems to have been sold as a non-war. Officially at least, no civil war ever happened!<sup>62</sup>

To delve a little further into our main historical narratives, Appian's emphasis, as already mentioned, centres around the dynasts. *B Civ.* 5.55 refers to an agreement between Ahenobarbus and Antonius (later to change sides to Young Caesar just before Actium). This becomes an issue when they arrive at Brundisium, as the gates are closed. The reason given is the enemy Ahenobarbus. Antonius lays siege to the city and instructs Sextus to raid Italy.<sup>63</sup> We are closing in on a conflict between the two Triumvirs. Appian claims that the soldiers of Young Caesar knew this, and were planning and hoping to prevent it; if not, there would be war.<sup>64</sup> One of the reasons cited for Antonius' mere arrival in Italy is the army of Calenus (see above). This is about the balance of power. Sextus' attack on Southern Italy was however repelled by Agrippa.<sup>65</sup> In the end the death of Fulvia allegedly helped to solve

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60 Vell. Pat. 2.77.3; Tac. *Ann.* 5.1; Suet. *Tib.* 5.1.

61 Welch 2019; Dio Cass. 48.27; open warfare: 48.28.2; see below.

62 Suet. *Aug.* 9.1: *bella civilia quinque gessit: Mutinense, Philippense, Perusinum, Siculum, Actiacum; e quibus primum ac novissimum adversus M. Antonium, secundum adversus Brutum et Cassium, tertium adversus L. Antonium triumviri fratrem, quartum adversus Sextum Pompeium Cn. filium* ("The civil wars which he waged were five, called by the names of Mutina, Philippi, Perusia, Sicily, and Actium; the first and the last of these were against Marcus Antonius, the second against Brutus and Cassius, the third against Lucius Antonius, brother of the Triumvir, and the fourth against Sextus Pompeius, son of Gnaeus").

63 App. *B Civ.* 5.56.

64 App. *B Civ.* 5.57.

65 App. *B Civ.* 5.58.

matters. Reconciliation followed rather than full-blown civil war: Antonius orders Sextus back to Sicily, and a new deal between the Triumvirs is struck.<sup>66</sup> In this case Antonius is emphasised as the main strategist, understanding that a deal with Sextus Pompeius would be necessary to stop the raids and the famine in Rome.<sup>67</sup> Initially Young Caesar disagrees, but this clearly points towards the Misenum deal.

Cassius Dio also emphasises the great game of dynasts. Antonius' siege of Brundisium was the direct result of a deal with Sextus, consequently making Young Caesar his enemy.<sup>68</sup> All things considered this seems a little simplistic. Initially Dio suggests that there was in fact outright war between the Triumvirs:<sup>69</sup> "The two leaders thus broke out into open war and were sending messages to the various cities and to the veterans, wherever they thought they could get any aid; and all Italy was again thrown into turmoil, especially Rome, and some were already choosing one side or the other, and others were hesitating. While the leaders themselves and those who were to assist them in the war were in a state of suspense, Fulvia died in Sicily, where she had been staying" (συνερρωγόντων τε οὖν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ διαπεμπόντων πρὸς τε τὰς πόλεις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐστρατευμένους, ὁπόθεν τινὰ ὠφελίαν προσλήψεσθαι ἐνόμιζον, ἢ τε ἄλλη Ἰταλία αὐθις ἐταράσσεται καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη ὅτι μάλιστα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἤδη πρὸς ἐκάτερον μεθίσταντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμελλον. μετεώρων δὲ αὐτῶν τε ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν συμπολεμησόντων σφίσιν ὄντων, ἡ Φουλουία ἐν Σικυῶνι, ἐν ᾗ ἦν, ἐτελεύτησε). The war between the Triumvirs is clearly marked out as a *polemos*.<sup>70</sup> The death of the warmonger Fulvia is again given as a reason or pretext for reconciliation. Without going into detail about the potential sources used by Appian and Cassius Dio, the negative role played by Fulvia – an obstacle – is part of the Livian tradition.<sup>71</sup> A new arrangement is struck. Sextus is the new enemy, even if Antonius had previously held a deal with him. Dio sums up this conflict as follows, viewing civil war through the lens of human nature:<sup>72</sup>

66 App. *B Civ.* 5.63-65; agreement: marriage between Antonius and Octavia.

67 App. *B Civ.* 5.65.

68 Dio Cass. 48.27.5.

69 Dio Cass. 48.28.2-3.

70 Vell. Pat. 2.76.3 talks of fear, *metus*, of war before describing the peace arrangement at Brundisium.

71 Liv. *Per.* 127: *bellum adversus Caesarem*.

72 Dio Cass. 48.29.3.

τοσοῦτος μὲν δὴ καὶ τῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν πολέμων παράλογός ἐστι, δίκη μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν τὰ πράγματα ἐχόντων νομιζόντων, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τάς τε αἰεὶ χρείας καὶ τὰ συμφέροντά σφων τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον ἐξεταζόντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοτὲ μὲν ἐχθροὺς τοτὲ δὲ ἐπιτηδεῖους σφίσι πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἡγουμένων.

So great, indeed, is the perversity that reigns in factional strife and war; for men in power take no account of justice, but determine on friend and foe according as their own interests and advantage at the time dictate, and accordingly they regard the same men, now as their enemies, now as their friends, according to the occasion.

There follows a section pointing towards the Misenum treaty and later war with Sextus Pompeius. But again it must be remembered that – according to Dio – after Perusia, Young Caesar had wanted to reconcile himself with Sextus.<sup>73</sup> This failed.<sup>74</sup> Dio may even be suggesting that even after the Pact of Brundisium, Antonius was still negotiating with Sextus. Whatever the case, two basic lessons can be learned. This is about dynasts – including Sextus Pompeius – and their wish to place themselves in the best possible position. This also explains the second point, giving insight into the Triumviral period more broadly: how a war ends may explain why the next begins. The Brundisium affair seems partly a continuation of issues between the two main Triumvirs: the issues at Perusia and the disagreement regarding Sextus; in general the question of how to move forward and accomplish the assignment of the Triumvirate. The wars are seen as personal wars between dynasts. In both sources this provides us with a take on human nature, explaining how human nature affects civil war and vice versa.

#### 4. Honours

The aftermath of the Pact of Brundisium presents further peculiarities. The honours given to the two Triumvirs after the pact at first appear problematic to say the least; but are they? Cassius Dio is certainly reserved: the “victors” moved across the *pomerium* in triumphal dress and on horseback “as if at a triumph” (ἐν δ’ οὖν τῷ τότε ἐπὶ τε ἵππων αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ἐν ἐπινικίοις τισὶν ἐσαγαγόντες).<sup>75</sup> The joint ovation is mentioned on the *Fasti*

<sup>73</sup> Dio Cass. 48.20.1.

<sup>74</sup> The basic differences between Appian and Dio are outlined by Gowing 1992: 187-189.

<sup>75</sup> Dio Cass. 48.31.3.

Triumphales and consequently officially recognised as a triumph in Augustan times, but in Dio's mind this was not a real ovation.

The Fasti Triumphales entry for the joint ovation of 40 BCE is revealing: *Imp. Caesar Divi f. C. f. IIIvir r(ei) p(ublicae) c(onstituendae) ov[ans, an. DCCXIII] quod pacem cum M. Antonio fecit [—]* ("40 BCE: While Imp. Caesar Divi f. C. f. IIIvir r p c celebrated an ovation because he made peace with Antonius").<sup>76</sup> Antonius is likewise recorded because he made *pacem cum Imp. Caesare*. There is neither foreign nor civil enemy, but an ovation was granted because the two Triumvirs made peace with one other. In isolation each of these two entries would be strange, but taken together they can only suggest one thing: the Triumvirs were granted this honour for not starting a civil war, or alternatively, for ending a civil war; which of the two we choose depends on what we think happened at Brundisium. It may even have indirectly included Perugia, but in principle – to focus only on the inscription – this was solely about the two Triumvirs and their ceremonial entry in ovation. An ovation in continuation of the Pact of Brundisium. Having said that, this was evidently not a traditional victory celebration. No enemy was mentioned: merely the fact of peace (or, significantly, the absence of civil war). This was a celebration of the inner logic of the Triumvirate. We should note also that both entries naturally include the title of 'Triumvir'. This was about securing peace after civil war (assuming that one was confessedly declared; it is noteworthy that there was no celebration after Philippi) and about constituting the state. Both of these components encompass the assignment of the Triumvirate. This celebration also happened not because of victory itself but the absence of a conflict that could lead to one; this is revealing of the shifting ideologies of civil war in the Late Republic.

Again, there is more information to be added to this enquiry. The joint ovation can hardly suggest that the assignment of the Triumvirate had been accomplished; for a start, the issue of Sextus Pompeius was still in the balance. But this was a turning point in the scale of that balance: the Triumvirs were again working jointly for the constituting of the *res publica*. The Triumvirs will no doubt have thought such a statement politic in the wake of Perugia, Brundisium, and all the rest. This was a sign of unity! A sign of unity, but using, importantly, the distinctive language of the

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76 Degraffi 1947: 86-87, 568, cf. 342-343, Fasti Barberiniani.

Triumvirate: *pax*, certainly, and possibly with an indirect emphasis on the ending of civil war, or a *phase* of it. This idea of phases is clearly visible after Actium.<sup>77</sup> The civil war did not have to be mentioned, but was there for all to see. This was symbolic and emphasised the end of civil war: retrospectively, looking perhaps back before Brundisium; and prospectively, looking forward to the at least temporary prevention of further conflict, for example Brundisium and Sextus Pompeius.

In 2016 I suggested two basic approaches to the joint ovation of 40 BCE:<sup>78</sup> first, an emphasis on avoiding civil war; and secondly, the ending of civil war and ceremonial entry. The two can easily be combined. This was a new kind of celebration. It was one of many innovations in the language and ideology of civil war: note, for example, that Caesar's ovation of 44 BCE was held without reference to a prior war, victory, or even enemy.<sup>79</sup> In a development of this approach, the ovation of Young Caesar and Antonius was a celebration for the peaceful outcome of the difficulties at Brundisium. The *Fasti Triumphales* is proof of these difficulties of the Triumvirate around 40 BCE. Importantly, the *Fasti* were never retrospectively changed and the entries survive. But surely this is much more than a ceremonial entry. The two narratives combined suggest that the absence of civil war was vital. This may partly be the precursor of the Parthian Settlement of 20 BCE: a diplomatic concord as opposed to civil war.<sup>80</sup> The marriage between Antonius and Octavia was publicly staged in Rome, immediately following the entry into the city of Antonius and Young Caesar in triumphal dress, on horseback. That the Senate had to allow Octavia an exemption from the ten-month waiting period following Marcellus' death shows this was very much a matter of public concern.<sup>81</sup> The Triumvirs were certainly willing to take traditions to their limits and beyond, but as a statement of reconciliation – especially toward their

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77 Cf. the inscription of the victory monument at Actium; see Lange 2016: 142-143; Actium as a war, not just a battle; Lange 2009: 73-93.

78 Lange 2016: 114-115, 157-158; 114: avoiding civil war.

79 Degraffi 1947: 86-87, 567.

80 Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 5.40-41 mentions a proposal made to honour Lepidus because he avoided civil war with Sextus Pompeius in 44 BCE.

81 See Plut. *Ant.* 31; App. *B Civ.* 5.64; Dio Cass. 48.31.3; Osgood forthcoming emphasises that although men had political power, women worked effectively within that system, and could take the initiative; Sumi 2005 on ceremony and power in the outgoing Republic.



soldiers – as well as a way of turning the difficult period of the Triumvirate into a symbol of how dramatically affairs had improved under their leadership. Peace was secured. There seems to be an inner logic to this.

Where does this leave us? The policy of peace and end of civil war emphasised by Young Caesar/Augustus goes not only back to Caesar (see above), but was jointly created – or so we may assume – with his fellow Triumvir Marcus Antonius. It derives from the Triumvirate and in 40 BCE we see a slightly underdeveloped approach, one to be perfected over the years to come. There are two basic possibilities. First, at this early stage the ideology of *pax* had not yet developed into a subtle, bifurcated approach emphasising both a foreign-war victory and the ending of civil war. The emergence of those two related narratives would come later. Secondly, this was not Sicily nor North-western Greece: this was Italy. Furthermore, the Triumviral assignment of ending the civil war was logically not aimed at the Triumvir's internal struggle. After Brundisium there was one narrative – peace between the Triumvirs, whatever context we provide for this information – while later, there were two distinct but non-conflicting narratives.

Take the victory over Sextus Pompeius: the *Res Gestae* refer to Sextus Pompeius as a pirate, and in this connection mention slaves.<sup>82</sup> This is supported by two letters from 36 BCE written by Young Caesar which accuse Sextus Pompeius of encouraging piracy.<sup>83</sup> The piracy narrative was not developed late and retrospectively.<sup>84</sup> The narrative concerning the ending of civil war is also found in 36 BCE: Young Caesar was given an honorific column on the Forum, adorned with *rostra*, a golden statue, and an inscription: “Peace, long disrupted by civil war, he restored on land and sea” (τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν).<sup>85</sup> Welch has pointed to the fact that Appian writes τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν τότε στάσεων ἐδόκει τέλος εἶναι (“This *seemed* to be the end of *staseis*”).<sup>86</sup>

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82 Chapter 25; cf. *RGDA* 27.3 on the servile war.

83 App. *B Civ.* 5.77, 80; cf. Hor. *Epod.* 9, 9-10, fighting a slave war.

84 *Contra* Welch 2012: 10, cf. 278-279.

85 App. *B Civ.* 5.130; cf. *RGDA* 25.1. The context of 5.130 and 5.132 suggests “civil war”; Appian (*B Civ.* 5.132) uses the word *stasis* – clearly referring back to the inscription – to describe the end of civil war. What would be Latin have been? Surely *bellum civile*. See also Welch 2019.

86 Welch 2019; App. *B Civ.* 5.132.



There was no end of civil war. But whereas that was the end goal, it was an assignment in different phases. The *Res Gestae* 13 mentions three decreed closings of the Temple of Janus: *pax* by degrees. Peace was not a constant, at least not until Actium and Alexandria were secured.

The campaign that ended at Actium was declared outright against Cleopatra in 32 BCE, but later turned into a civil war when she received help from Antonius.<sup>87</sup> Again Young Caesar could claim to end the civil war(s), and again a civil war started again by his opponent.<sup>88</sup> The slogan *pax parta terra marique* – prominently used in 36 BCE, which Appian renders into Greek – is connected by several Latin authors to Augustus' closure of the Temple of Janus as well as to his peaceful settlement after the civil war against Antonius. This is clearly reflected by Livy, who writes of a period "after the battle of Actium, when the emperor Caesar Augustus had brought about peace on land and sea" (*post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta*).<sup>89</sup> In remarkably similar fashion, Suetonius writes that Augustus "closed three times the temple of Janus Quirinus, which had been closed but twice before his time since the founding of the city, in a far shorter period, having won peace on land and sea" (*Ianum Quirinum semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum in multo brevioris temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit*).<sup>90</sup> The slogan *pace parta terra marique* is also used on the Victory Monument at Actium, emphasising that peace had been secured on land and sea. No enemy is mentioned, which in turn does point to a civil war.<sup>91</sup> Augustus' in the *Res Gestae* boasts to have ended *bella terra et mari civilia externaque*.<sup>92</sup>

## 5. Civil War(s) as *Exempla*

In a Roman context *exempla* often denotes the citation of exemplary figures of the past, distinguished by their great services to the *res publica*. In

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87 Lange 2009; 2016.

88 *RGDA* 34.1; see above.

89 Liv. 1.19; cf. 30.45.1; *Laudatio Turiae* 2.25; Sen. *de Clementia* 1.9.4; *Apocolocyntosis* 10.2.

90 Suet. *Aug.* 22.

91 Lange 2016: chapter 6.

92 *RGDA* 13; 3.1, 4.2.

the words of Roller, they are rhetorical devices that effectuate persuasion.<sup>93</sup> Deeds or actions were also memorialised by monuments.<sup>94</sup> After the victory over Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE at Naulochus, the Senate and Young Caesar naturally turned to Duilius as the model victor at Mylae.<sup>95</sup> The honorific statue on a *columna rostrata* was copied in 36 BCE (see above). Duilius was the first Roman to fight and win a major sea battle. Roller emphasises that “[B]y appropriating the iconography of a monument commemorating a famous victory over a feared external enemy, he paraded his own victory, actually won in civil war, as being a proper victory over foreigners – or at least he conveniently elided the distinction between civil and external war”.<sup>96</sup> But Young Caesar did in fact no such thing! Certainly it is obvious that he was appropriating the great victor, but at the same time the inscription of the rostral monument makes clear that this was set up as an honour for the civil war victor, for the victor who had ended civil war. The victor had two non-conflicting narratives.

This suggests that for Young Caesar it was vital to commemorate his victories in a traditional manner, while at the same time not forgetting the sole basis for his political legitimacy, namely the Triumviral assignment. This was a civil war monument, one set up as an honour in 36 BCE. This is about commemoration, but also about legitimising a civil war. This is political initiative in times of civil war, using Duilius as an *exemplum*. This was after all not just a civil war, this was a victory in war against the enemies of Rome. Here we return, full circle, to Sulla: a great war to suit a great general. This is why the Romans kept using the language of foreign war when describing civil war, naturally developing and changing it over time. It is also about what Roller describes as “a degree of moral change”.<sup>97</sup> A moral change where the emphasis placed upon civil war ceases merely to focus on its horrors, and rather refashions it into a narrative of the positive outcome of victory. Civil war, therefore, is re-established as a (“positive”) *exemplum*.

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93 Roller 2018: 1.

94 Roller 2018: 6.

95 Roller 2018: 134-162; Kondratieff 2004.

96 Roller 2018: 150; cf. Bleckmann 2002: 121: “Details wurden bewußt vermieden, um nicht an den Umstand erinnern zu müssen, daß der Sieg gegen Sextus Pompeius in einem Bürgerkrieg errungen worden war.”

97 Roller 2018: 163, regarding Fabius *Cunctator*.

Cicero famously uses negative historical *exempla* in the *Philippics*.<sup>98</sup> Reflecting on Mutina and a potential declaration of Antonius as *hostis*, Cicero mentions Romans who wanted civil war: L. Cornelius Sulla, C. Marius, Cn. Octavius, L. Cornelius Cinna, C. Marius the Younger and Cn. Papirius Carbo. Yet it is precisely these figures, especially the likes of Sulla, Caesar, and Young Caesar, who tried to create their own counter-*exempla*, both in their writings as well as in the honours awarded to them, and the ideologies that both conveyed.

As for the joint ovation of 40 BCE, it is hardly a surprise that Antonius and Young Caesar decided to use the language of the Triumvirate when commemorating their internal struggle—one that almost came to a premature blow. When the blow finally came, Young Caesar still decided to use the same language of reconciliation, of peace after civil war. At the same time the foreign-war card was naturally played and the war was declared on Cleopatra. They were two non-conflicting narratives. The Triumvirate was rightly at the centre of attention during this civil war period. The recurring aspect of civil war, as we have seen, involved also recurring debates and recurring levels of justification. Here, as ever, Thucydides is the great teacher: civil strife inflicted many a terrible blow, as it always does, and always will, while human nature remains the same.<sup>99</sup> This article has tried to place Brundisium within a series of different attempts to figure out how to end civil war. In the end the Pact of Brundisium was a very ‘Caesarian’ moment: they should not be fighting and the veterans did not want them fighting. The joint ovation of 40 BCE may have aimed to give the hopeful impression of breaking that cycle; but whether its audience was convinced is anyone’s guess.

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<sup>98</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 8.7; 14.23; see van der Blom 2019; Urso 2016 on Sulla as a negative *exemplum*.

<sup>99</sup> Thuc. 3.82.1; 3.82.2: καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ; Armitage 2017b.

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